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14. ABSTRACT The way we fight wars has been evolving over thousands of years. Today, the U.S. Navy, finds itself in the post-modern area of war fighting. Joint warfare is the latest evolution of war fighting in order to dominate in current and future conflicts. The policy makers of the United States recognized the need for the armed forces to train officers to think "jointly." This led to requirements for the officer corps to meet joint educational and joint experience expectations. The shift in the mindset to joint operations has left the Navy without a core of officers at the operational level to serve as experts in operational art and joint warfare. The Navy needs to establish a community of Joint Warriors. These Joint Warriors will serve as residence experts on the Navy Component Commander and Fleet Commander staffs.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

JOINT WARRIOR

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

04 May 2011

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Abstract

The way we fight wars has been evolving over thousands of years. Today, the U.S. Navy, finds itself in the post-modern area of war fighting. Joint warfare is the latest evolution of war fighting in order to dominate in current and future conflicts. The policy makers of the United States recognized the need for the armed forces to train officers to think “jointly.” This led to requirements for the officer corps to meet joint educational and joint experience expectations. The shift in the mindset to joint operations has left the Navy without a core of officers at the operational level to serve as experts in operational art and joint warfare. The Navy needs to establish a community of Joint Warriors. These Joint Warriors will serve as residence experts on the Navy Component Commander and Fleet Commander staffs.

INTRODUCTION

The way we fight wars has been an evolving process over several centuries since the very first conflict between men. Over time, wars became more intricate and affected larger numbers of men and societies as a whole. As the military intellect grew and the complexity of war became more understood, hundreds of men throughout history wrote about the theory and principals of war to achieve one objective - winning. In more recent history, we have learned that success at the tactical level of war requires an understanding of the operational level of war in the form of joint warfare. **In order for the U.S. Navy to improve its joint operational expertise, the U.S. Navy should establish a community and career field of joint operation experts to staff the Combatant Commanders (CCDR), as well as, the Naval Component (NCCOM) and Fleet Commanders (FLTCOM).**

Today, the Navy finds itself in the post-modern era of war fighting. Joint warfare is the latest evolution of warfare. The most effective way to defeat an enemy is through inter-service cooperation and the understanding of the operational level of war. There are countless military documents, text books, and professional articles on the subject of Joint Warfare. The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), likewise, addresses the need for militaries to evolve, “Every military force in history that has successfully adapted to the changing character of war and the evolving threats it faced did so by sharply defining the operational problems it had to solve.”¹ The USJFC recognizes the need for the armed forces to become joint focused; however, the Navy has not fully embraced this concept.

The reluctance of the Navy to embrace joint warfare can be attributed to the Navy’s long history of unit level independence and independent unit deployment. Additionally,

¹ United States Joint Force Command (USJFC), *The JOE 2010: The Joint Operating Environment*, (18 February 2010), Forward.

since World War II, the Navy is its own self-contained armed force. All aspects of tactical warfare are covered within its organization. Integration of the cultures of naval air, surface, subsurface, infantry through the U.S. Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces through the Navy Sea, Air and Land Teams (SEAL), leads the Navy's way of thinking. Simply stated, the Navy has been "joint" through the maritime services in its planning processes at the operational level within the Department of the Navy (DON).

This approach is naive. The Navy needs to establish a professional career field of dedicated officers that operates primarily at the operational level of war and in joint operations. This would benefit the operational staffs in the Navy (NCCOM/FLTCOM). Furthermore, the Navy's knowledge of joint warfare and application of operational art will drastically improve. This will lend to greater credibility when the Navy works with the other armed services on joint matters.

CIVILIAN LEDERSHIP CHANGES THE ARMED SERVICES

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (G-N Act) revamped the Department of Defense (DOD) and better defined the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).² Previously, the branches of the armed services had problems with inter-service integration. The root of the problem with integrating the services was due to inter-service rivalry and service stovepiped planning. This Act also addressed a joint education requirement for the officer corps of the armed services. Educating the officers through a joint curriculum would help facilitate better inter-service understanding and planning.

² *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. Public Law 99-443, 99th Cong., 1 October 1986. This Act was sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols that redefined the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman is the principle military advisor to the President, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense.

The John Warner National Defense Act of 2007 (Warner Act) is the most recent change brought forth from the civilian leadership. The Warner Act improves the process of designating an officer as a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO).³ These updated standards reinforce education requirements and set the experience level that must be obtained while serving on an approved Joint Duty Staff. In improving the Joint Qualification process, the armed services train the officer corps to think jointly earlier in one's career. Additionally, JQO standards are tied to promotion to the senior ranks. If an officer fails to meet the JQO standards, he is not promotable beyond the rank of O-6 without a waiver.⁴

U. S. NAVY MEETS REQUIRED JOINT STANDARDS

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D provides direction to the armed services on Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). This direction ensures the armed services are preparing their respective departments' officer corps to think and understand joint concepts and operations. The Chairman states, "Professional development is the product of a learning continuum that comprises training, experience, education, and self-improvement. PME provides the education needed to complement training, experience, and self-improvement to produce the most professionally competent (strategic-minded, critical-thinking) individual

³ *HR 5122 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007*. Public Law 516-519, 109th Cong., 17 October 2006. Division A - Department of Defense Authorizations, Title V - Military Personnel Policy, Part III - Joint Officer Management Requirements Section 516 - Revises the system for the designation and management of joint qualified officers (JQOs) to replace the term "joint specialty officer" with "joint qualified officer." Requires the Secretary to establish different levels of joint qualification, as well as the criteria for qualification at each level, and requires each level to have joint education and joint experience criteria.

⁴ U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 36, Subchapter II, § 619a: An officer on the active-duty list of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps may not be appointed to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has been designated as a joint qualified officer in accordance with section 661 of this title.

possible.”⁵ The CJCSI 1800.01D, along with other CJCSIs, compliments the joint qualifications standards set forth in the Warner Act. With multiple requirements and standards for building a joint minded officer corps, the Navy understands why joint warfare is the concept desired by the CJCS and the civilian leadership.

To conform to the JQO guidelines, the Navy tracks every officer’s qualification related to their educational milestones and joint duty experience. The Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) - Joint Officer Management (PERS-45J) uses the Joint Qualification System (JQS), established in the Warner Act, to monitor and validate joint qualifications for naval officers. PERS-45J works with each respective warfare community to fill the required joint billets in the DOD and other government agencies.⁶ This process is simple and does not require extraordinary dedication to achieving the JQO standards. By the Navy fulfilling the joint requirements, this can be considered evidence that the Navy has embraced the joint mentality.

Officers not afforded the opportunity for in-residence education for JPME are not deterred from achieving JQO. These officers can complete JMPE I via correspondence.⁷ Once JPME 1 complete, an officer can self-nominate for joint credit towards achieving JQO. The limiting factor in self-nomination is an officer’s assignment history. All officers are required to serve on an approve Joint Duty Staff for JQO. The drawback in achieving JPME 1 through correspondence is missing out on the opportunity for in-residence education.

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 1800.01D), *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMED)*, (15 July 2009), A-1.

⁶ Bureau of Naval Personnel Website, Officer Assignments. <http://www.npc.navy.mil/Officer/JointOfficer/> (accessed 18 February 2011).

⁷ CJCSI 1800.01D states two levels of JPME for officers. JPME 1 is for junior officers (O-3 through O-4) while JPME II is for midgrade to senior officers (O-4 through O-6). Only JPME 1 can be completed via correspondence.

Completing JPME 1 via correspondence competes with the individual's time in performance of his military duties and responsibilities.

U. S. NAVY INVESTS IN OPERATIONAL PLANNERS

The Navy several years ago developed a year-long school at the Naval War College dedicated to operational level planning (Naval Operational Planning Course). Today this course is known as the Maritime Advance Warfighting School (MAWS). The curriculum for MAWS consists of detailed training on the Joint Planning Process, Operational Art, and war gaming. MAWS graduates approximately 30 officers each year, to include officers from the other services. These operational planners will serve on the CCDR, NCCOM and FLTCOM staffs upon graduation.

Additionally, the Navy introduced a limited specialty career path in fiscal year 2010.⁸ This specialty is designed for experienced naval operational planners and an officer must apply for selection. The specialty is called Naval Operational Planner and is not synonymous with the MAWS graduate. The key demographic for selection for this specialty career path is from Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) to Captain (CAPT) that is a JQO. Thus, an officer does not have to be a MAWS graduate, but must already be JQO. This specialty is expected to grow to 70 officers.

The primary stake holder for this new specialty, including the detailing requirements, is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Information, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5). These specialty officers will fill a steady state manning requirement with roughly 19 billets on OPNAV N3/N5 staffs and various training staffs. The concept is for these specialists are

⁸ Specialty Career Path Brief by Bureau of Naval Personnel, 12 February 2010, <http://www.npc.navy.mil/Officer/SPECIALTYCAREERPATH.htm> (accessed 25 March 2011).

to focus on Navy doctrine and plans.⁹ This is further evidence the Navy is taking strides to become joint orientated and increase the knowledge base of its officer corps. With the JQO standards and NOP specialty, the Navy is meeting the requirements laid out in G-N and Warner Acts.

JOINT WARRIOR

Joint Warfare requires a professional core of naval officers who are experts in area operational planning and have significant joint experience to improve the Navy's joint war fighting capability. The U.S. Navy has over 320,000 active duty members with over 50,000 in the officer ranks.¹⁰ Although the Navy is a war fighting organization, there is more manpower dedicated to running the Navy administratively to provide the CCDRs with maritime warriors, then actual "tip of the spear" war fighters. This requires the officer corpss to train in diverse disciplines. War fighting is just a piece of the expected knowledge foundation to be an effective officer.

The primary focus of an officer below the rank of LCDR is to become a tactical expert (Figure 1). As an individual progress through the ranks, there may be exposure to the joint operations thru JQO standards, but with increased rank, there are increased areas of leadership and management a senior officer must master.

By the time Navy officers achieve the rank of captain (O-6), they have been carefully screened and selected for evidence of having developed expertise in leadership, some aspects of management, and in the Navy and/or defense enterprise itself. Indeed, assignments in the joint arena are required before an O-6 can be promoted to flag rank in any military service. Such assignments provide important experience in the defense enterprise. However, an individual is unlikely to have developed substantial

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY11*, Table 1-2a: Active Military Manpower Totals, (December 2010), 3.

expertise in more than one operational or functional domain in addition to that represented by his or her designator code.¹¹

Does being Joint Qualified truly better the Navy's Joint Warfare capability? Does the contribution to joint matters by the Navy carry significant weight compared to our sister services at the operational and strategic levels of war? Does having a newly developed specialty career for 70 officers in Naval Operational Planning (NOP) make our NCCOM/FLTCOM better prepared to operate in the joint environment?

The reality is most officers work towards their JQO to complete a "check in the block" to ensure they are on track for the following career milestone. The creation of a Naval Operational Planner specialty demonstrates an initiative to improve the Navy's core understanding of joint operations. However, this limited number of NOP officer will be detailed to OPNAV and training staffs.¹² The result will have minimal effect on the Navy's overall operational level of joint war fighting skills.




Figure 1. The Officer Professional Military Education Continuum. (adapted from CJCSI 1800.01D Annex A to Enclosure A, Appendix A)

¹¹ Lawrence M. Hanser, Louis W. Miller, Herbert J. Shukiar and Bruce Newsome. *Developing senior Navy leaders: requirements for flag officer expertise today and in the future*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 19.

¹² Specialty Career Path Brief by Bureau of Naval Personnel (accessed 25 March 2011).

PERISHABLE SKILLS

The complexities and understanding of the operational art, operational design, and the joint environment, takes significant training and time to become a functional joint officer. If the Navy's goal is to have joint exposure, vice expert knowledge, of the officer corps, then the JQO program is adequate. However, once a naval officer completes a Joint Staff assignment, he may never serve on a Joint Staff or significant naval staff again. Thus, all his knowledge gained from his JQO process atrophies. He will be a better officer with exposure to the joint environment, but inevitably he will be back to driving ships, flying aircraft, running bases, training Sailors, or managing the naval organization. These disciplines are required to maintain the Navy's readiness, but where is the Navy's core of experts on joint warfare?

The experience and knowledge gained through JQO standards may only become a factor again if an officer stays on a promotable track. If an officer is promoted to flag rank, his previous joint experience could be an asset. If this same flag officer gained joint exposure through JQO, then it may have been several years since serving on a Joint Staff. Additionally, the flag officer detailing process does not traditionally involve sequential joint tours on an operational level staff. Flag officers are expected to be leaders in diverse disciplines, and once again leaving joint experience to atrophy. A study conducted on developing Flag officers revealed, "The variety of expertise required of Navy flag officers is evident in the organizations they lead or serve in and in the titles of the billets they hold. Navy flag officers can be found in all major organizations of the Navy, as well as many Department of Defense (DOD) and joint and combined military organizations."¹³

¹³Hanser, Miller, Shukiar and Newsome, *Developing senior Navy leaders: requirements for flag officer expertise today and in the future*, 6.

The Navy's Admirals will thrive in the Flag/General Officers ranks, but again, what happens to the core of joint experience at the mid-grade officer level (LCDR to CAPT)? To maintain the Navy's joint war fighting expertise requires a community of officers to stay in Joint Warfare and at the operational level of war. This would include professional in-residence education and multiple joint tours for an officer to be a Joint Warfare expert. Both the Navy, as well as the operational staffs, will benefit having Joint Warriors.

CRITICAL NEED WITH LIMITED OPERATIONAL PLANNERS

The Navy has a shortage of Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) officers to staff the requirements on the NCCOM/FLTCOM staffs (These NOPC AQD coded officers should not be confused with the new NOP specialty officers). The NCCOM/FLTCOM operational level staffs require approximately 140 billets manned by NOPC AQD officers. These billets are at the heart of the Navy's operational level war (Figure 2). Currently, BUPERS struggles to fill these billets due to lack of qualified officers.¹⁴ This is another indication that there is a need for a Joint Warrior career field to relieve the burden of manning these NOPC coded billets.

The expertise sought at these critical operational level billets are graduates of MAWS who receive the NOPC AQD. However, new MAWS graduates have not yet gained any experience at the operational level of warfare and require time to learn the intricacies of the operational staff environment. Furthermore, these new arrivals to NCCOM/FLTCOM staffs are not likely to have served on a Joint staff prior to serving on these Navy staffs. Finally, once a NOPC AQD officer has completed serving his tour at NCCOM/FLTCOM staff, it is

¹⁴ Notes from a phone conversation with JMO aviation detailer (29 March 2011).

likely he will never serve at the operational level of planning again. Once more, experience that is gained is not continued at the operational level.




Figure 2. U.S. Navy Operational Organization. (adapted from “Forces/Capabilities Handbook,” *Joint Military Operations Reference Guide*, Naval War College, Newport, RI [July 2009]; 4.)

Another issue with the limited number graduates from MAWS is how a graduate is detailed after their in-residence education. These specialty trained officers with NOPC ADQ do not always go directly to an operational level staff. The priority for these newly trained naval planners is to be detailed to their next career milestone.¹⁵ Some graduates will return to their warfare community and focus on the tactical level of war in the form of department heads or follow on career milestone. The trend is apparent as mentioned before, newly gained education and operational level skills atrophy. The Navy’s operational expertise

¹⁵ Notes from a conversation with Patrick A. Molenda, CAPT, USN, MAWS Department Head at the Naval War College (3 March 2011).

suffers. The few that do not go directly to an operational level staff miss out on the opportunity to reinforce their education with experience.

BUILDING A JOINT WARRIOR CAREER FIELD

Now is the time to establish a new career field that focuses on the operational levels of war and joint warfare. The idea of specialized career fields in the Navy is not a new concept. There is a justified need for staffing the CCDR/NCCOM/FLTCOM staffs with joint experts. The MAWS output and NOP specialty model fall short in providing enough entry level officers with the proper education. This inevitably hurts the Navy's ability to continue growing its expertise in Joint Warfare and being a valued contributor to the joint process. Furthermore, a Joint Warrior from a newly established career field that has previously served on a joint staff and then serves on a NCCOM/FLTCOM staff, brings joint experience and more credibility than an entry level MAWS graduate.

The Navy can expect several talented Unrestricted Line (URL) Officers that are JQO, but then fail to achieve the following career milestone in their warfare community. These "off track" officers may find themselves searching for an alternate career field to continue to serve in the Navy. Such alternate career fields available are, Foreign Area Officer (FAO), Aviation Engineering Duty Officer (AEDO), Engineering Duty Officer (EDO), or a number of other Restricted Line (RL) officer communities. A Joint Warrior career field allows upward mobility for these experienced officers, while also providing the expertise for the Navy. This is not to say the officers that currently serve in alternate career paths (FAO/AEDO/EDO) were ever off track. It can be rightfully assumed that many of them found that they wanted to serve in an area of interest other than the traditional URL

community. The desire to serve in an area of Joint Warfare could be the social norm for officers wanting to become a Joint Warriors.

Establishing this Joint Warfare career field should mirror current career fields of AEDO/EDO. The Joint Warrior career field should have a selection board process to choose officers with the greatest potential to be a Joint Warrior. The applicant should have previously proven themselves as a competent officer in their current URL warfare community. The applicant should be endorsed by a senior officer they have served under through a recommendation. Finally, the Joint Warfare community should have its own detailers and community managers that are Joint Warrior themselves.

Once selected into the community, a Joint Warrior must attend in-residence education at the Naval War College, if he has not previously attended. Attending MAWS would be the preferred course in order to gain a foundation in operational art, operational warfare and exposure to joint planning. However, attending the College of Command and Staff at the Naval War College (CNSC) will provide another avenue to receive in-residence education. Additional avenues for Joint Warriors to get in-residence education include: U.S Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAWS), U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, U.S. Marine Corps School of Advance Warfighting (SAW), Marine Corps Command and Staff College, U.S. Air Force School of Advance Airpower Studies (SAAS), and U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College.

Following the educational requirements, the detailing assignment for a Joint Warrior should be serving on a CCDR staff, followed by a NCCOM/FLTCOM staff (Figure 3). The critical piece in this career flow is to ensure a CCDR staff is followed by a NCCOM/FLTCOM staff. The joint experience gained while on the CCDR staff is immediately built

upon on the NCCOM/ FLTCOM staff. The desired outcome is that the Joint Warrior gains approximately six years at the operational level of war and the joint environment. Adherence to this career path will assure that an officer can say he is an expert in the Joint Warrior community.

<u>Joint Warrior</u>	Shore	Shore	Sea	Shore	Sea / Shore
	In-residence Education	1st Joint Tour on Combatant CDR Staff	Component or Fleet CDR Staff	OPNAV staff or 2nd Joint Tour	War College Staff or second Component/Fleet CDR Staff
	1yr	3 years	3 years	3 years	3 years
	LCDR		CDR		CDR/CAPT

Figure 3. Proposed Joint Warrior career path.

Once the Joint Warrior has completed two tours on an operational level staff, he can expect to rotate to an OPNAV N3/N5 staff tour. When a Joint Warrior is assigned to OPNAV3/5, he will be a significant contributor to writing and revising naval doctrine, plans and strategy. Currently, only a handful of URL officers will serve on an OPNAV staff during their career. It could be argued these URL officers are not vested in writing doctrine at the operational or strategic levels of war. However, a Joint Warrior brings an abundance of experience on joint warfare and naval planning to improve the Navy's doctrine and plans writing. With this career flow in mind, the Navy's operational expertise is translated into doctrine and plans by Joint Warriors that have served several years at the operational level.

Finally, a Joint Warrior may find themselves at the Naval War College or service equivalent as a staff professor. This will raise the level of expertise at any of the service schools' war colleges. With roughly eight to ten years of experience in joint operations,

operational art, planning, and reviewing or revising doctrine, the Joint Warrior's expertise can be transferred to the future leaders in a professional education environment.

JDAL FY 2010			
ORGANIZATION	TOTAL	ORGANIZATION	TOTAL
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) & OSD Staff	432	National Security Agency	142
DoD Inspector General	2	American Forces Information Service	2
The Joint Staff	882	Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office	13
National Defense University	128	Washington Headquarters Services	8
Inter-American Defense Board	4	Missile Defense Agency	54
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization	22	National Reconnaissance Office	19
US Joint Forces Command	856	White House	18
US Central Command	783	National Security Council	16
North American Aerospace Defense Command	142	Office of National Drug Control Policy	10
US European Command	781	Department of Energy	7
US Strategic Command	1023	Department of State	34
US Pacific Command	1239	Central Intelligence Agency	7
US Special Operations Command	1034	Director, Central Intelligence	1
US Southern Command	520	US Northern Command	504
US Transportation Command	267	Joint Requirements Office for CBRN	5
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	938	Joint Advanced War fighting Program	11
Air Force	34	United States Military Observer Group - Washington	6
Army	78	Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate	6
Marine Corps	12	Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program	1
Navy	32	National Security Space Architect	21
Defense Contract Management Agency (CSA)	17	Defense Acquisition University	1
Defense Information Systems Agency (CSA)	68	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization	82
Defense Intelligence Agency (CSA)	930	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance	10
Defense Logistics Agency (CSA)	109	Defense Business Transformation Agency	5
Defense Security Cooperation Agency	21	U.S. African Command	408
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (CSA)	166	National Guard Bureau	5
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency	47	GRAND TOTALS	11963

Table A. Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) (adapted from 2010 JDAL, Microsoft EXCEL file, from BUPERS website, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA225741>) (accessed 21 April 2011).

SETTING THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF JOINT WARRIORS

It will take time to understand the appropriate number of Joint Warriors needed to fill the community. By analyzing the current requirements of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL), an estimate can be made to provide a preliminary number of officers for the community. There are just under 12,000 joint positions throughout the DOD and other government agencies (Table 1). Assuming twenty percent of these positions are staffed by naval officers, the required contribution is approximately 2400. Of these 2400 billets, approximately a quarter of them should be staffed by Joint Warriors. The rest of the

remaining billets will continue to be staffed by officers pursuing their JQO standards. That is roughly 600 billets for the Joint Warrior in reference to the JDAL.

The same formula for the JDAL can be applied to the Navy's NOPC ADQ coded billets established within the NCCOM/FLTCOM staffs. Of the 140 NOPC coded billets, 35 of them can be manned by Joint Warriors. Additionally, the Joint Warrior will fill the 19 NOP specialty billets designed to staff the OPNAV 3/5 and training staffs. Thus, an estimate for the community should be roughly 650 officers. Lessons learned as the community matures will fine tune the required amount of Joint Warriors.

FLAG RANK AND THE JOINT WARRIOR

Since 1960's, the Navy has shifted from an officer corps that was well balanced in technical and non-technical disciplines, to a more technically-focused officer corps. Some of these skills in the non-technical disciplines were at the operational level of war that included joint integration and naval planning.¹⁶ The advent of the Cold War led to technological advancements such as nuclear power, inter-continental ballistic missiles, jet engines, stealth technology, and satellite technology. These technological innovations required the naval officer to master a more technical way of war fighting. This technical mindset further increased a culture divide between the separate warfare communities in the Navy.

The byproduct of an unbalanced officer corps leads to the Navy to place a higher value on warfare specialty expertise vice a diverse background. With a higher appreciation for warfare specialty excellence, each community values an officer's tactical expertise vice a joint expertise. Thus, each community tends to identify their top performing officers and

¹⁶ Mark R. Hagerott, "Rebalancing the Naval Officer Corp," in *Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corp*, (February 2010), 42.

groom them for future success. This is accomplished by recognizing potential early and detailing that talent to obtain the appropriate career milestones. The career path for naval leadership is not focused on Joint Warfare within the communities but rather exposure through the JOQ standards. CAPT Mark R. Hagerott addresses this phenomena and the need to “rebalance” the Navy’s officer corps. He stated this in an article about rebalancing the officer corps, “For more than a generation, platform communities have largely determined who will be the Navy’s senior executives, the flag officers. It is to be expected that platform communities will advocate on behalf of their best performers, but such platform centrism offers little support for officers who have excelled in joint, international, interagency, or technical assignments not closely linked to a parent platform community.”¹⁷

The establishment of a Joint Warrior career field, Joint Warfare officers should have the opportunity for selection to flag rank. Unlike the traditional URL Flag officer that has a record of technical expertise, a Joint Warrior will have a non-technical record of expertise. The few Joint Warriors that continue to demonstrate sustained superior performance shall be the Navy’s flag level experts on Joint Warfare. Key positions where a Flag Joint Warrior would serve are senior positions in CCDR staffs or leading OPNAV 3/5.

CONCLUSION

The Navy has complied with getting the officer corpss the required exposure to the joint environment. The JOQ process accomplishes this exposure, but these standards are the minimums. Once achieving the JOQ, most officers are back in their warfare specialty. Comparing the JOQ process to officer warfare qualifications, it takes several years of

¹⁷ Ibid., 47.

standing the watch, driving ships, flying aircraft, or learning a discipline to become an expert. The need for a Joint Warfare community is required to improve the Navy's joint operational expertise. These handpicked warriors will focus on the operational level planning, the joint environment, and ultimately fill the Navy's joint expertise at the operational level of war.

Growing the Navy's intellect at an expert level and ability to operate in the joint environment is what a Joint Warrior will deliver. This newly developed community of experts will gain years of experience dealing in the joint matters. Admiral Mike Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes the transition to even more joint operations is critical at the strategic level. "This strategy also sets a vector toward transition from a force that has been engaged in sustained combat operations to a Joint Force that is shaped for the future. As the challenges we face require a Joint Force that is flexible, agile, and adaptive, it emphasizes people as much as platforms."¹⁸ This required transformation set in our military strategy requires intellectual experts in joint operations to achieve our national goals.

The Navy needs to be forward-leaning. It needs to look at the long vision of the changing aspects of warfare to joint warfare. The Navy should take the lead of the other armed services by investing in the future of the Joint Warrior. The orders need to be given, the course set, the bell ordered. The Navy should start driving toward the objective of embracing Joint Warfare.

¹⁸ Michael G. Mullen, Admiral, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Redefining America's Military Leadership*, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011, (08 February 2011), 21.

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